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Abstract: 
We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka 
and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same 
subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which 
the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. 
We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment. We discuss how these results compare 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A growing number of studies in economics appeal to the influence of social norms to explain 
behaviors that are difficult to reconcile with models of rational and self-interested decision 
making (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Nikiforakis et al., 2012; Gächter et al., 2013). 
Recently, Krupka and Weber (2013, hereafter KW) have introduced a norm-elicitation task that 
allows a more objective approach to the identification and measurement of norms. In this method 
subjects are shown a list of actions available to a decision-maker in a given situation and are 
asked to evaluate whether each action is "socially appropriate" or "socially inappropriate". 
Subjects are given material incentives to coordinate their evaluation with that of other 
participants in the experiment. Thus, subjects have an incentive to reveal their perception of what 
is collectively recognized as appropriate behavior (i.e. the social norm), rather than their own 
personal views of appropriateness.
1
 
The KW elicitation method has been recently used to explain behavior in a variety of 
decision settings, including dictator games (Krupka and Weber, 2013; Krupka et al., 2014; Erkut 
et al., 2015), gift-exchange games (Gächter et al., 2013), and oligopoly pricing games (Krupka et 
al., 2014).
2
 These applications are based on between-subject designs where the norm elicitations 
and behavioral regularities are obtained from experiments using different subjects.
3
  
However, within-subject designs (where norms and behavior are elicited from the same 
subjects) may offer a number of advantages over between-subject designs for testing the 
explanatory power of social norms.
4
 First, within-subject designs allow to control for the effects 
of idiosyncrasies in the subject pools used for the measurement of norms and behavior. If the 
characteristics of the subjects involved in the norm-elicitation task are different from those of the 
subjects whose behavior is observed, the explanatory power of the elicited norms may be reduced. 
Moreover, within-subject designs can address questions that may not be answered with a 
                                           
1
 This is important as social norms are collectively recognized rules of behavior. Ostrom (2000), for example, 
defines norms as "shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden" (pp. 143-144). 
Elster (1989) emphasizes that for "norms to be social, they must be shared by other people" (p. 99). 
2
 The KW method has also been used outside of a laboratory context, to explain the on-the-job behavior of financial 
advisers (Burks and Krupka, 2012). 
3
 An eExceptions to this areis Nikiforakis et al. (2014), who use a within-subject design to study the explanatory 
power of norms against exploitation and coercion, and Barr et al. (2015), who study discrimination in the context of 
an allocator game.  
4
 See Charness et al. (2012) for a general discussion of the relative merits of between- and within-subject designs.  
3 
 
between-subject design, such as whether subjects who behave in violation of a given norm do so 
because they fail to recognize the relevant norm, or rather because they are not sufficiently 
motivated to follow norms despite being able to identify them. Clearly, for this analysis, one 
needs to correlate normative evaluations and behavior elicited from the same subjects.  
One serious obstacle to the use of within-subject designs is that the order in which the 
norm-elicitation and behavioral experiments are conducted may systematically affect the elicited 
norms and behavior. On the one hand, eliciting norms after having elicited behavior may 
introduce systematic biases in the measurement of norms. For instance, subjects may be prone to 
self-serving judgment biases whereby they manipulate their evaluation of what constitutes 
appropriate behavior in a given situation to reconcile it with the choices that they have previously 
made in that situation. In fact, several studies have found evidence of self-serving biases in 
(unincentivized) fairness judgments (e.g., Konow, 2005; Croson and Konow, 2009). On the other 
hand, eliciting norms before eliciting behavior may systematically affect subjects' choices. 
Theories of social norms (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; Bicchieri, 2000) emphasize that norm 
compliance requires that norms are salient and that subjects' attention is focused on the rules of 
appropriate behavior. Eliciting normative judgments before subjects make a choice in a given 
situation may focus their attention on the norms that prevail in that situation, and may thus affect 
behavior. In fact, Krupka and Weber (2009) find that dictator giving increases when dictators are 
asked to report their fairness views before making a choice.  
In this paper, we describe an experiment where we test these order effects in the elicitation 
of norms. As an application, we focus on norms that regulate corrupt behavior, using a version of 
the bribery game introduced by Cameron et al. (2009).
5
 We use the KW method to elicit subjects' 
normative views about such behaviors. In one treatment we elicit norms of corruption before 
asking subjects to make a choice in the bribery game, and reverse the order of tasks in another 
treatment.  
Overall, our experiment delivers little evidence of order effects in our within-subject design. 
The norms elicited from subjects who had not yet played the game are not systematically 
different from those elicited from subjects who had previously played the game. We also find 
little evidence that eliciting norms affects subsequent behavior in the bribery game. We conclude 
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 See Abbink (2006) and Banuri and Eckel (2012) for reviews of laboratory experiments on corruption. 
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the paper with a discussion of how our results compare with the related literature (Krupka and 
Weber, 2009; Bicchieri and Chavez, 2010; Barr et al., 2015; Erkut et al., 2015) and a 
recommendation for researchers interested in using the KW method in within-subject 
experiments later in the paper. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Our experiment consisted of two parts. In one part subjects played a version of the bribery game 
adapted from Cameron et al. (2009, hereafter CCEG). In the other part we elicited subjects' 
normative views of corruption using the KW task. 
The bribery game used in the experiment is shown in Figure 1. At the beginning of the 
game subjects are randomly matched in groups of three and randomly assigned to one of three 
roles: firm, public official, or citizen.
6 
Figure 1 – The bribery game 
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 All payoff amounts are in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the end of the experiment ECUs payoffs were 
converted into GBP at the following rates: 6 ECUs = 1 GBP for the firm, 4 ECUs = 1 GBP for the official and 3 
ECUs = 1 GBP for the citizen. As in CCEG, the choice of conversion rates was aimed at keeping expected earnings 
comparable across roles. 
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The firm moves first and decides whether to initiate a corrupt act, by bribing the official. If 
the firm decides to offer a bribe, it has to choose a bribe amount 𝐵 = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. Offering the 
bribe implies a cost of 2 to the firm, regardless of whether the bribe is accepted. If accepted, the 
bribe increases the firm’s payoff by 3𝐵. The public official moves next: she observes whether the 
firm has offered a bribe and, if so, decides whether to accept it. Accepting the bribe is profitable 
for the official, whose payoff is also increased by 3𝐵, but implies a  negative externality on 
society, captured by a reduction of 7𝐵 in the citizen’s payoff.7 Finally, the citizen observes the 
firm's and official's decisions and is given the opportunity to punish corrupt behavior. In 
particular, if the firm has offered a bribe and this has been accepted by the official, the citizen can 
sanction the firm and the official, by choosing whether or not to punish them, and if they choose 
to punish, by selecting a punishment amount 𝑃𝐹 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and 𝑃𝑂 = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, for 
the firm and official respectively. Punishment is costly for the citizen as the total amount 
punished 𝑃𝐹 + 𝑃𝑂 is subtracted from the citizen's payoff. Punishment also reduces the firm's and 
official's payoffs by 3𝑃𝐹  and 3𝑃𝑂, respectively.  
We implemented a one-shot version of this game, using the strategy method to elicit the 
official's and citizen's decisions. These choices were collected in an incentive-compatible way: 
the firm's actual bribing decision determined which of the official's choices (if any) was actually 
relevant. This in turn determined which of the citizen's punishment decisions (if any) was 
relevant for computing payoffs.  
The KW norm-elicitation task was used to elicit subjects’ perceptions of the 
appropriateness of engaging in corrupt behavior and punishing bribery. Subjects were described a 
scenario involving an act of corruption and an act of punishment of corrupt behavior. We elicit 
judgments of appropriateness of four different actions: i) a firm manager's decision to offer a 
bribe to a public official; ii) the public official's decision to accept the bribe; iii) a citizen's 
decision to punish the firm for offering the bribe; and iv) the citizen's decision to punish the 
public official for accepting the bribe. In each case, subjects evaluated whether the action was 
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 Thus, our game is a version of the welfare-reducing game used by CCEG, where corruption is not justified by any 
efficiency motive. 
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“very socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially 
appropriate”, or “very socially appropriate”.8 
Subjects received a monetary reward if their appropriateness judgments matched the 
judgments provided by others. For each action, subjects received a payment of £0.50 if their 
judgment of the action matched that of a randomly drawn other person in the session. As 
discussed in KW, this gives subjects an incentive to reveal what they perceive to be the jointly 
recognized perceptions of the appropriateness of the behaviors described in the scenario, and not 
their own personal perception of appropriateness.
9 
 
Our design consists of two between-subject treatments: in our “NormFirst” treatment, 
subjects first participated in the norm elicitation task and then played the bribery game. In our 
“BehaviorFirst” treatment the order of the two tasks was reversed. In both treatments subjects 
were informed of the two-part structure of the experiment at the beginning of the session, but 
they were not given any information about the second part until everyone had completed the first 
part. Moreover, subjects completed the second part of the experiment without receiving any 
information feedback on outcomes from the first part. 
Our experiment allows us to measure the extent of self-serving judgment biases by 
comparing the norms elicited from the “impartial spectators” in the NormFirst treatment (i.e. 
from subjects who have not participated in a game that reproduces the scenario they are asked to 
evaluate) with those elicited from subjects who had previously played the bribery game in the 
role of firm, public official or citizen in the BehaviorFirst treatment. Moreover, to measure the 
extent to which participation in the norm elicitation task affects subsequent behavior (e.g., by 
focusing subjects’ attention on normative considerations), we compare choices in the bribery 
game in the NormFirst treatment with those in the BehaviorFirst treatment, where subjects were 
not primed to think about norms of corruption before playing the game.  
                                           
8
 Note that in the norm-elicitation task subjects were not asked to evaluate the specific actions that players could take 
in the bribery game, but a more general corruption situation that was modelled based on the bribery game. This 
design choice differs from previous applications of the KW method and was made because the large action space of 
the game made it impractical to elicit judgments of appropriateness of each possible action in the game. An 
implication of this is that we cannot perform a within-subject analysis to test whether the perception of 
appropriateness of actions in the game predicts their use in the experiment. We discuss further implications of this 
design choice in section 4.  
9
 The material incentives used in the task generate a coordination game with multiple equilibria. KW argue that 
jointly recognized social norms create focal points in this game, which subjects are likely to exploit to coordinate.  
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Overall, 204 subjects participated in the experiment, 102 in each treatment. The experiment 
was conducted at the University of Birmingham using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were 
recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Each session lasted approximately 1 hour, and subjects 
earned, on average, £19.94 (including a £2.50 show-up fee).10 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 The effect of game play on elicited norms 
In this sub-section we examine whether making choices in the bribery game affects subjects' 
subsequent normative judgments about offering and accepting bribes and punishing corrupt 
behavior. Table 1 reports the full distributions of ratings elicited from subjects in the 
BehaviorFirst and NormFirst treatments. In the former case, we distinguish between ratings 
elicited from subjects who took the role of firm, public official, or citizen in the bribery game.
11
 
In the latter case, this is not needed because subjects had not yet participated in the bribery game 
when norms were elicited (and thus, assignment to specific roles had not yet taken place).  
Table 1 – Appropriateness ratings across treatments 
 Firm Official 
Action Mean -- - + ++ Mean -- - + ++ 
OfferBribe -0.75 68% 26% 6% 0% -0.65 53% 41% 6% 0% 
AcceptBribe -0.84 79% 18% 3% 0% -0.80 76% 18% 6% 0% 
PunishFirm 0.80 0% 3% 24% 73% 0.90 0% 0% 15% 85% 
PunishOfficial 0.77 0% 3% 29% 68% 0.88 0% 0% 18% 82% 
 Citizen NormFirst 
Action Mean -- - + ++ Mean -- - + ++ 
OfferBribe -0.80 76% 18% 6% 0% -0.80 80% 12% 6% 2% 
AcceptBribe -0.82 76% 21% 3% 0% -0.77 76% 14% 8% 2% 
PunishFirm 0.78 0% 0% 32% 68% 0.79 1% 1% 27% 71% 
PunishOfficial 0.78 0% 0% 32% 68% 0.82 1% 2% 21% 76% 
Note: responses are “very socially inappropriate” (--), “somewhat socially inappropriate” (-), 
“somewhat socially appropriate” (+), “very socially appropriate” (++). Modal responses are shaded.  
The ratings are remarkably similar across treatments. Both the impartial normative 
judgments elicited in the NormFirst treatment and those elicited in BehaviorFirst show that a 
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 The experimental instructions are reproduced in the Online Supplementary Material. 
11
 As in KW, mean ratings were constructed by converting responses into numerical scores using the following scale: 
“very socially inappropriate” = -1, “somewhat socially inappropriate” = -1/3, “somewhat socially appropriate” = 1/3, 
“very socially appropriate” = 1. 
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large majority of subjects think that offering and accepting bribes is very socially inappropriate. 
The punishment of corrupt behavior is instead viewed as very socially appropriate by most 
subjects in either treatment. Moreover, within the BehaviorFirst treatment, we observe little 
differences between ratings collected from firms, public officials, and citizens. In all cases, the 
modal response by either type of subject coincides with that in the NormFirst treatment.  
We formally analyze the responses in the different treatments by using Fisher’s 
randomization tests.
12
 We start by comparing, for each of the four actions, the ratings elicited in 
the NormFirst treatment with those elicited in the BehaviorFirst treatment, without distinction as 
to the role taken in the bribery game. For each action, we do not detect statistically significant 
differences between ratings elicited in the NormFirst and BehaviorFirst treatments (all p > 0.270). 
We next compare the ratings elicited in NormFirst with those elicited either from firms, 
public officials, or citizens in BehaviorFirst. Eleven of the twelve possible comparisons are 
statistically insignificant at the 10% level, according to Fisher’s randomization tests. The 
exception occurs for the action OfferBribe, which subjects in the role of public official in 
BehaviorFirst rated as relatively less inappropriate than subjects in NormFirst (p = 0.097). 
However, this result must be interpreted with caution due to the multiple testing problem, which 
increases the overall type I error rate. None of the statistical comparisons is significant if we 
apply a Bonferroni correction to account for the multiple testing. 
3.2 The effect of norm elicitation on game play  
We next examine whether asking subjects to report their views about norms of corruption affects 
subsequent behavior in the bribery game. To do so, we compare the behavior of subjects in the 
NormFirst treatment with that of subjects in the BehaviorFirst treatment. Figure 2 summarizes 
the behavior of firms (Panel 1), public officials (Panel 2), and citizens (Panels 3 and 4) in the two 
treatments of the experiment. 
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 See Moir (1998) for a discussion of the randomization test. 
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Figure 2 – Behavior across treatments 
 
Starting with the behavior of firms (Panel 1), 27% of firms chose not to offer any bribe to 
the public official in the BehaviorFirst treatment. The proportion of non-bribing firms in 
NormFirst is 32%. This difference is not statistically significant according to a 𝜒2 test (p = 0.595). 
More generally, we do not find any significant difference in the distributions of bribes offered in 
the two treatments (𝜒2 test, p = 0.172). We also do not detect significant differences in the 
average bribe offered across the two treatments (5.29 in BehaviorFirst; 4.78 in NormFirst; 
Fisher’s randomization test, p = 0.583). 
Looking at the proportion of public officials who were prepared to accept a bribe of a given 
amount (Panel 2), we find that, in both treatments, the acceptance rate increases in the bribe 
amount: only about half of the officials were willing to accept the lowest bribe amount of 4, but 
about 80% were willing to accept the highest bribe amount of 8. Acceptance rates are very 
similar between the two treatments. In fact, for any bribe amount, we do not detect any 
significant differences between the proportion of officials accepting the bribe in BehaviorFirst 
and NormFirst (𝜒2 tests, all p ≥ 0.329). 
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Turning to citizen’s behavior, we find that citizens' punishment against firms (Panel 3) 
averages between 1.2 and 1.4 depending on the bribe offered in BehaviorFirst, although there is 
no clear monotonic relation between punishment and bribe amount. In NormFirst the punishment 
amount increases monotonically in the bribe offered: average punishment increases from 1.03 
when firms offer the lowest possible bribe to 2.35 when firms offer the highest possible bribe. 
While the differences in punishment between the two treatments appear qualitatively large, 
especially for bribe amounts of 7 and 8, we detect insignificant differences in punishment 
behavior between treatments using Fisher’s randomization tests when firms offer a bribe of 4, 5, 
6 or 7 (all p ≥ 0.195). We detect a weakly significant difference in punishment behavior when 
firms offer a bribe of 8 (p = 0.062). However, none of the statistical comparisons is significant if 
we apply a Bonferroni correction to account for multiple testing. 
For citizens' punishment against public officials (Panel 4), we find that in both treatments 
there is a weakly positive correlation between punishment and bribe amount. The pattern is 
similar across treatments and using Fisher’s randomization tests we do not detect any statistically 
significant differences in punishments for any bribe amount (all p ≥ 0.689). 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper we tested the effects of eliciting social norms of appropriate behavior in within-
subject designs where the same subjects make a choice and express a judgment about appropriate 
behavior in a given decision setting. We have considered two possible effects. On the one hand, 
eliciting normative judgments after having asked subjects to make a choice in a decision setting 
may distort the measurement of norms because subjects may be prone to self-serving biases that 
lead them to distort their view of what constituted appropriate behavior to justify their choices in 
the decision situation. On the other hand, eliciting normative judgments before subjects make a 
choice in the decision setting may affect their behavior as this may draw subjects' attention to the 
relevant social norms and encourage norm compliance. 
We test these effects in a version of the bribery game originally introduced by Cameron et 
al. (2009). We elicit social norms using the method introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). In 
one treatment subjects play the bribery game first and then report judgments of appropriateness 
in the KW task. In the other treatment, the order of tasks is reversed. 
11 
 
We find that norms elicited from subjects who had previous experience with the decision 
situation they are asked to evaluate are not systematically different from norms elicited from 
"impartial spectators", who report their normative judgments of appropriateness before having 
played the game. We also find little evidence that focusing subjects on social norms of corruption 
affects their subsequent behavior in the bribery game (possibly with the exception of punishment 
behavior, which in some cases seems more pronounced when subjects are first asked to focus on 
normative considerations). 
Our results suggest that order effects are relatively unimportant in the context of the KW 
norm-elicitation tasks. But what is the generalizability of these findings? While our study 
contributes to the study of order effects in one specific scenario (related to corrupt behavior) 
using a specific experimental setting, comparisons with the existing literature may shed some 
light on the extent to which the use of norm-elicitation tasks is generally likely to generate order 
effects.  
We are aware of two other studies that report the effects of eliciting norms from subjects 
who have played the game they are asked to evaluate: Barr et al. (2015) and Erkut et al. (2015).
13
  
We are aware of three studies that report the effects of eliciting normative judgments on 
subsequent game behavior: Krupka and Weber (2009), Bicchieri and Chavez (2010) and Barr et 
al. (2015).
14
 Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the effect sizes and confidence intervals reported in 
these studies, as well as in our study.  
Figure 3 shows the average effect sizes of letting subjects participate in the norm elicitation 
task after having played the game they are asked to evaluate.
15
 The figure is divided into two 
panels. In the left panel we report effect sizes for actions that are generally viewed as 
“inappropriate” or “unfair” (offering a bribe; accepting a bribe; keeping more than half of the pie 
in a dictator game; discriminating against others in an allocator game). The right panel contains 
actions that are instead typically considered as “appropriate” or “fair” (punishing someone who 
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 Barr et al. (2015) study discrimination in the context of an allocator game. Erkut et al. (2015) study dictator game 
giving. Also related is Veselý (2015), who studies whether the elicitation of norms is affected by prior elicitation of 
fairness judgments in an ultimatum game, and finds that the order in which the two types of judgments are elicited 
does not affect them. 
14
 Krupka and Weber (2009) study dictator game giving. Bicchieri and Chavez (2010) study proposer’s offers in the 
ultimatum game. Barr et al. (2015) study discrimination in the context of an allocator game. 
15
 The figure reports, for each paper, an average effect size computed for a given action or group of actions. See the 
Online Supplementary Materials for details on how these average effect sizes were computed. 
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has offered or accepted a bribe; offering half of the pie or more in the dictator game; not 
discriminating against others in the allocator game). In all studies, and for both types of actions, 
the reported effect sizes are very small (never larger than 0.25) and statistically indistinguishable 
from zero. Moreover, we do not observe a clear separation between “unfair” and “fair” actions: it 
is not the case, for instance, that playing the game beforehand makes unfair actions generally 
more acceptable or reduces the appropriateness of fair actions (as one would expect if normative 
judgments were prone to self-serving biases). Overall, these results show that norms elicited from 
“impartial spectators”, who have no experience with the game they are asked to evaluate, are 
unlikely to differ systematically from norms elicited from subjects who have just played the 
game.
16
 
Figure 3 – Effect size of eliciting norms after behavior 
  
Note: Effect sizes are computed using Hedges’ g (Hedges, 1981). Bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. DDN_F: this paper, avg. appropr. of firm offering bribe. 
DDN_O: this paper, avg. appropr. of official accepting bribe. ENS_U: Erkut et al. 
(2015), avg. appropr. of unfair dictator offers. BLN_D: Barr et al. (2015), avg. 
appropr. of discriminating. DDN_CF: this paper, avg. appropr. of citizen punishing 
firm. DDN_CO: this paper, avg. appropr. of citizen punishing official. ENS_F: Erkut 
et al. (2015), avg. appropr. of fair or hyperfair dictator offers. BLN_ND: Barr et al. 
(2015), avg. appropr. of not discriminating. 
Figure 4 shows the average effect sizes of eliciting behaviors from subjects who have just 
expressed a normative judgment about those behaviors.
17
 Figure 4 is also divided into two panels, 
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 The fact that the findings from the literature are in line with our results is reassuring, especially because one 
concern with our study is that the norm-elicitation task used in our experiment does not use the same action space of 
the bribery game, which may have minimized the likelihood of one task influencing the other. The fact that similar 
findings are also reported by studies where subjects are asked to evaluate the exact same actions available in the 
game (Barr et al., 2015; Erkut et al., 2015) mitigates this concern. 
17
 See the Online Supplementary Materials for details on how the effect sizes were computed. 
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for domains of behavior that generally have a “negative” connotation (left panel: discrimination; 
corruption), or a “positive” connotation (right panel: punishment of corrupt actions; dictator or 
ultimatum game giving). In most cases the effect sizes are small and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. However, in two cases (Krupka and Weber, 2009; Bicchieri and 
Chavez, 2010) the reported effect sizes are fairly large (0.80 and 0.40, respectively) and, in the 
case of Krupka and Weber (2009), statistically different from zero.
18
 Moreover, Figure 4 also 
shows that focusing subjects’ attention on normative considerations tends to reduce the 
occurrence of behaviors that have a “negative” connotation (discrimination, corruption), while it 
increases the occurrence of “positive” behaviors (punishment of corruption; giving). This is in 
line with a focusing effect of norms on behavior: focusing subjects’ attention on norms of 
appropriate behavior seems to have a polarized impact on behaviors that are inappropriate or 
appropriate, by decreasing the occurrence of the former while increasing that of the latter.  
Figure 4 – Effect size of eliciting behavior after norms 
  
Note: Effect sizes are computed using Hedges’ g (Hedges, 1981). Bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. BLN: Barr et al. (2015), average discrimination. DDN_F: this 
paper, average bribe offered by firm. DDN_O: this paper, average bribe acceptance by 
official. DDN_CF: this paper, average punishment by citizen to firm. DDN_CO: this 
paper, average punishment by citizen to official. KW: Krupka and Weber (2009), 
average dictator game offer. BC: Bicchieri and Chavez (2010), average ultimatum 
game offer. 
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 Note, however, that the elicitation methods used by Krupka and Weber (2009) and Bicchieri and Chavez (2010) 
differs from the KW method that we follow here and that Barr et al. (2015) also follow. The fact that Krupka and 
Weber (2009) report a stronger effect compared to our study may be due to the fact that that the framing used in our 
bribery game may be per se more conducive to a normative focusing effect than the relatively more neutral frame 
used in the dictator game of Krupka and Weber (2009). This would be in line with Banerjee (2015) who studies 
different versions of a bribery game, where the game is either neutrally framed or framed in the context of corruption 
and bribery, and shows that the game frame affects judgments of social appropriateness and influences behavior. 
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Taken together, our results and the findings from previous studies suggest that normative 
judgments elicited using the KW task are robust to self-serving biases whereby individuals may 
tend to adjust their moral views to accommodate their past actions. Existing findings paint 
instead a more mixed picture of the effects of eliciting norms from subjects who are about to 
make decisions in related decision settings. On balance, if researchers intend to elicit social 
norms using a within-subject design, the evidence from our study and the existing literature 
suggests that this is less likely to generate distortions if norms of appropriate behavior are elicited 
after subjects have made a choice in the decision situation.  
15 
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ONLINE SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS  
 
A. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS  
Below we report the instructions used in the experiment. The instructions were used in the 
BehaviorFirst treatment, In the NormFirst treatment the order of Part 1 and Part 2 was inverted. 
 
 
PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS 
Welcome! You are about to take part in a decision-making experiment. This experiment is run by the “Birmingham 
Experimental Economics Laboratory” and has been financed by various research foundations. Just for showing up 
you have already earned £2.50. You can earn additional money depending on the decisions made by you and other 
participants. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions with care. 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any questions, or need 
assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out 
loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of these 
rules. 
We will first jointly go over the instructions. After we have read the instructions, you will have time to ask clarifying 
questions. We would like to stress that any choices you make in this experiment are entirely anonymous. Please do 
not touch the computer or its mouse until you are instructed to do so. Thank you. 
This experiment consists of two different parts, PART 1 and PART 2. In each part you will be asked to make one or 
more decisions and will have a chance to earn money. The amount of money you will earn in each part of the 
experiment will depend on your decisions and may depend on other participants’ decisions. The total amount you 
will earn from the experiment will be the sum of the earnings you make in the two parts of the experiment. You will 
be informed about your earnings from the two parts of the experiment only at the end of the session. Therefore, in 
PART 2, everyone will make their decisions without knowing any outcome from PART 1. Attached with these 
preliminary instructions, you find the instructions for PART 1 of the experiment. You will receive new instructions 
for PART 2 once everyone in the room has completed PART 1. 
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PART 1 
General Instructions 
In PART 1 of today’s experiment, participants are divided into groups of three. You will therefore be in a group with 
2 other participants. You will be presented with a real-life-like situation where you will be randomly assigned to the 
role of the Manager of a Firm, a Government Official, or a Citizen. Your role will be randomly assigned to you by 
the computer and will be shown to you on the computer screen. We ask you to assume the role assigned to you as 
described later and to make decisions in the same way you would if you were in the situation presented. You will not 
know who the other participants in your group are. 
 
The money that you make in PART 1 will be called payoffs.  Payoffs are denoted in experimental currency units, or 
ECUs. At the end of this session, these ECUs will be converted into cash using the following exchange rate: for the 
Firm the exchange rate is 6 ECUs = £1, for the Official it is 5 ECUs = £1 and for the Citizen it is 4 ECUs = £1. 
 
The situation you will be facing is the following. The Firm has to decide whether it wants to offer the Official a bribe 
or not. The Official has to decide whether to accept the bribe or not. The Citizen has two choices: to punish the Firm 
and/or the Official for offering and accepting the bribe respectively, or not to punish them. We will now provide you 
with detailed instructions for each role. 
 
Detailed Instructions for Firms 
In today’s experiment, if you are a Firm, you have to decide whether to offer the Official a bribe or not. If you 
decide not to offer a bribe, then the participants get the following amounts: the Firm gets 60 ECUs, the Official gets 
30 ECUs, and the Citizen gets 80 ECUs. If you choose to offer a bribe, then you have to choose how much to offer. 
You incur a cost of 2 ECUs for offering this bribe regardless of whether the Official accepts it or not. You can 
choose to offer an amount B, where B can be a whole number in between 4 and 8, i.e., B = (4, 5, 6, 7, 8).  
 
Detailed Instructions for Officials 
In today’s experiment, if you are an Official, at the moment you make your decision, you do not know yet the 
decision taken by the Firm in your group. Therefore, you need to make a decision for each possible choice that can 
be made by the Firm in your group. That is, for any possible amount of the bribe (B) that the Firm can offer, you 
have to decide whether to accept the bribe or not. Depending on the Firm’s choice, one of your decisions will 
become payoff relevant at the end of the experiment. If you decide not to accept the bribe, then the Firm gets 58, the 
Official gets 30, and the Citizen gets 80 ECUs. If you accept the bribe, then, conditional on the Citizen’s actions, the 
payoffs can be of two types. If the Citizen decides not to punish, then the following payoffs occur: Firm gets 60 – 2 
+ 3B, Official gets 30 + 3B, and Citizen gets 80 – 7B, where B is the amount of bribe offered by the Firm. If the 
Citizen decides to punish, then the following payoffs occur: Firm gets 60 – 2 + 3B – 3PF, Official gets 30 + 3B – 3PO 
and the Citizen gets 80 – 7B – (PF + PO), where PF and PO denote the amount of punishment chosen by the Citizen 
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for the Firm and the Official, respectively. The payoffs indicate that the bribe B offered by the firm gets multiplied 
by 3, if you decide to accept the bribe but this in turn will reduce the citizen’s payoff by 7 times the amount of the 
bribe. If the Citizen decides to punish, the amount of punishment also gets multiplied by 3. 
 
Detailed Instructions for Citizens 
If you are a Citizen in today’s experiment, at the moment you make your decision, you do not know yet the decisions 
taken by the Firm and the Official in your group. Therefore you need to make a decision for each possible bribe 
amount that can be offered by the Firm and accepted by the Official in your group. That is, for any possible amount 
of the bribe (B) that the Firm could offer and the Official could accept, you have to decide whether to punish them or 
not. If the Firm offers a bribe and the Official accepts it, one of your decisions will become payoff relevant at the 
end of the experiment. If the Firm and the Official in your group have offered and accepted a bribe respectively, 
your payoff automatically gets reduced by 7 times the amount of the bribe, B. This is the harm you suffer as a result 
of the act of bribery. You can punish the Firm, the Official or both of them if you wish. If you choose to punish the 
Firm, then you can choose a whole number in between 1 and 6, i.e., PF = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) as the amount of the 
punishment. If you choose to punish the Official, then you can choose a whole number in between 1 and 6, i.e., PO = 
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) as the amount of the punishment. If you decide to punish the Firm but not the Official, then the 
corresponding value of PO will be 0. Similarly, if you decide to punish the Official but not the Firm, then the 
corresponding value of PF will be 0. Each monetary amount of punishment that you choose will be multiplied by 3, 
and the corresponding payoffs of the Official and the Firm will be reduced by this tripled amount. Your payoff will 
be reduced by the sum of the amount of punishment you have chosen to assign to the Firm and the Official. 
The exact payoffs will be: Firm gets 60 – 2 + 3B – 3PF, Official gets 30 + 3B – 3PO, and Citizen gets 80 – 7B – (PF + 
PO). If you decide not to punish, then the payoffs will be: Firm gets 60 – 2 + 3B, Official gets 30 + 3B, and Citizen 
gets 80 – 7B. 
If you are a Citizen, you will see the following screen, where you need to enter your decisions.  
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Each row of the table you see in the screenshot represents one possible bribe amount which can be offered by the 
Firm and accepted by the Official. For each possible bribe amount, you have to enter the following decisions in the 
space provided: a) whether you want to punish the Firm and, if so, by how much, and b) whether you want to punish 
the Official and, if so, by how much. For instance, the first row of the table represents the case where the Firm 
decides to offer a bribe of 4 and the Official accepts. In the space provided on that row, you need to enter whether 
you want to punish the Firm and/or the Official by selecting “yes” or “no” in the corresponding cells. If you answer 
“yes” to either or both of these two questions, then you need to enter the amount of punishment you want to assign 
for the Firm and/or the Official in each of the two corresponding large boxes. If you answer “no” to either or both of 
these questions, then you need to leave empty the corresponding large box. Similarly, you also need to enter your 
decisions for the cases where the Firm decides to offer a bribe of 5, 6, 7 and 8 and the Official accepts, represented 
in the second, third, fourth and fifth row of the table, respectively. 
 
Figure 1 describes the general set-up and summarizes the structure of the experiment.  
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Control questionnaire 
 
To make sure everyone understands the instructions, please complete the questions below. In a couple of minutes 
someone will come to your desk to check your answers. Once everybody answers the following questions correctly, 
PART 1 of the experiment will start. (The decisions and payoffs used for the questions below are simply for 
illustrative purposes. In the experiment decisions and payoffs will depend on the actual choices of the participants.) 
 
1. Suppose that the Firm has decided to make a bribe of 6. The Official has decided to reject the bribe if the Firm 
offers a bribe of 5, 6 and 7 and to accept the bribe if the Firm offers a bribe of 4 and 8. The Citizen has decided to 
punish neither the Firm nor the Official. 
a) What is the payoff of the Firm?          
b) What is the payoff of the Official?         
c) What is the payoff of the Citizen?         
 
2. Suppose that the Firm has decided to offer a bribe of 8. The Official has decided to reject the bribe if the Firm 
offers a bribe of 4 and 5 and to accept the bribe if the Firm offers a bribe of 6, 7 and 8. The Citizen has decided to 
choose 1, 3 and 4 as the amount of punishment for the Firm if it offers a bribe of 4, 5 and 6, respectively. The Citizen 
has decided not to punish the Firm if it offers a bribe of 7 and 8. The Citizen has decided not to punish the Official. 
a) What is the payoff of the Firm?          
b) What is the payoff of the Official?         
c) What is the payoff of the Citizen?         
 
3. Suppose that the Firm has decided to offer a bribe of 5. The Official has decided to reject the bribe if the Firm 
offers a bribe of 4 and 7 and to accept the bribe if the Firm offers a bribe of 5, 6 and 8. The Citizen has decided to 
choose 1, 3 and 4 as the amount of punishment for the Official if the Firm offers a bribe of 5, 6 and 7, respectively. 
The Citizen has decided not to punish the Official if the Firm offers a bribe of 4 and 8. The Citizen has decided not 
to punish the Firm. 
a) What is the payoff of the Firm?          
b) What is the payoff of the Official?         
c) What is the payoff of the Citizen?         
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PART 2 
In PART 2 of today’s experiment, we will ask you and all other participants to evaluate different possible choices an 
individual might make. Specifically, we will describe a choice that an individual might have made, and you should 
decide whether making that choice would be “socially appropriate” and “consistent with moral or proper social 
behaviour” or “socially inappropriate” and “inconsistent with moral or proper social behaviour.” By socially 
appropriate, we mean behaviour that most people agree is the “correct” or “ethical” thing to do. Another way to 
think about what we mean is that, if someone were to make a socially inappropriate choice, then someone observing 
this behaviour might get angry at the person who made the choice for acting in that manner. 
In each of your responses, we would like you to evaluate what constitutes socially appropriate or inappropriate 
behaviour. To give you an idea, consider the following example.  
Someone is at a local cafe. While there, the person notices that someone has left a wallet at one of the tables. How 
appropriate would it be to take the wallet for yourself? 
Very 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very 
socially 
appropriate 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
If this were the situation we asked you about in the study, you would indicate the extent to which you believe taking 
the wallet would be "socially appropriate" and "consistent with moral or proper social behaviour" or "socially 
inappropriate" and "inconsistent with moral or proper social behaviour".  Recall that by socially appropriate we 
mean behaviour that most people agree is the "correct" or "ethical" thing to do. 
For example, suppose you thought that taking the wallet was very socially inappropriate. Then, you would indicate 
your response by selecting the first box.  
For each choice you make, we will compare your response to the response of one other randomly selected 
participant to this session.  If you give the same response as the one provided by the selected other participant, 
then you will receive an additional £0.50. This amount will be paid to you, along with your other earnings, at the 
conclusion of the experiment. 
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For instance, in the example situation above, if your response had been "somewhat socially inappropriate," then you 
would receive an additional £0.50 if this was also the response provided by a randomly selected other participant in 
today’s session. Otherwise you would not receive any additional money for this question. 
Are there any questions about this task? Once we continue, you will see detailed descriptions of the choices you are 
to evaluate and instructions on how to proceed.  
If you have any questions at any time, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to you. 
You will see how much you have earned from PART 2 at the end of the experiment.  
 
Question 1:  
Suppose that the manager of a firm would like a public official to award his/her firm a public contract, or grant it a 
permit or other benefit. How appropriate would it be for the manager to offer a bribe to the public official in such an 
instance? 
Very 
Socially 
Inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very 
socially 
appropriate 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
Question 2:  
Suppose that a public official is offered a bribe by the manager of a firm in exchange for awarding the firm a public 
contract, granting a permit or other benefit. How appropriate would it be for the public official to accept the bribe 
and grant the firm the contract, permit or other benefit?   
Very 
Socially 
Inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very 
socially 
appropriate 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Question 3:  
Suppose that a citizen is aware of an episode of bribery, having observed or been informed of the exchange of money 
for favours between a firm and a public official. 
A) How appropriate would it be for the citizen to punish the firm (for instance by reporting the bribe)? 
Very 
Socially 
Inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very 
socially 
appropriate 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
B) How appropriate would it be for the citizen to punish the public official (for instance by reporting the bribe)? 
Very 
Socially 
Inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very 
socially 
appropriate 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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B. EFFECT SIZE COMPUTATION 
We report effect sizes based on Hedges’ g statistic (Hedges, 1981). The effect sizes of eliciting 
norms after playing the game are based on three studies: the present paper, Barr et al. (2015) and 
Erkut et al. (2015). The effect sizes are based on the differences in appropriateness ratings 
measured either after or before a subject has played the game she is asked to evaluate. Table A.1 
reports, for each action evaluated by subjects, the corresponding effect size. In the main text we 
report average effect sizes for groups of actions that are generally viewed as “fair” or “unfair”. 
For papers with more than one treatment, in the main text we report effect sizes averaged across 
the treatments. The effect sizes reported in the main text are highlighted in the table. 
Table A.1 – Effect sizes of eliciting norms after behavior 
Study Treatment Action Comparison 
Effect Size 
(Hedge’s g) 
D’Adda, 
Drouvelis, 
Nosenzo 
(DDN) 
n.a. 
Firm offers bribe 
Firm vs Impartial Spectator 0.13 
Official vs Impartial Spectator 0.36 
Citizen vs Impartial Spectator 0.00 
AVERAGE REPORTED IN 
MAIN TEXT 
0.16 
Official accepts bribe 
Firm vs Impartial Spectator -0.18 
Official vs Impartial Spectator -0.09 
Citizen vs Impartial Spectator -0.13 
AVERAGE REPORTED IN 
MAIN TEXT 
-0.13 
Citizen punishes firm 
Firm vs Impartial Spectator 0.04 
Official vs Impartial Spectator 0.33 
Citizen vs Impartial Spectator -0.02 
AVERAGE REPORTED IN 
MAIN TEXT 
0.11 
Citizen punishes 
official 
Firm vs Impartial Spectator -0.14 
Official vs Impartial Spectator 0.19 
Citizen vs Impartial Spectator -0.09 
AVERAGE REPORTED IN 
MAIN TEXT 
-0.01 
Erkut, 
Nosenzo, 
Sefton 
(ENS) 
n.a. 
Give 0 out of 10 in 
dictator game 
Dictator vs Impartial Spectator -0.10 
Recipient vs Impartial Spectator -0.06 
Give 1 out of 10 in 
dictator game 
Dictator vs Impartial Spectator -0.21 
Recipient vs Impartial Spectator 0.09 
Give 2 out of 10 in 
dictator game 
Dictator vs Impartial Spectator 0.11 
Recipient vs Impartial Spectator 0.19 
Give 3 out of 10 in 
dictator game 
Dictator vs Impartial Spectator 0.06 
Recipient vs Impartial Spectator -0.11 
Give 4 out of 10 in 
dictator game 
Dictator vs Impartial Spectator 0.00 
Recipient vs Impartial Spectator 0.05 
 
AVERAGE REPORTED IN 
MAIN TEXT 
0.00 
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Give 5 out of 10 in 
dictator game 
Dictator vs Impartial Spectator 0.05 
Recipient vs Impartial Spectator 0.05 
Give 6 out of 10 in 
dictator game 
Dictator vs Impartial Spectator 0.10 
Recipient vs Impartial Spectator -0.06 
Give 7 out of 10 in 
dictator game 
Dictator vs Impartial Spectator 0.00 
Recipient vs Impartial Spectator -0.11 
Give 8 out of 10 in 
dictator game 
Dictator vs Impartial Spectator 0.06 
Recipient vs Impartial Spectator 0.13 
Give 9 out of 10 in 
dictator game 
Dictator vs Impartial Spectator -0.02 
Recipient vs Impartial Spectator 0.15 
Give 10 out of 10 in 
dictator game 
Dictator vs Impartial Spectator 0.00 
Recipient vs Impartial Spectator 0.20 
 
AVERAGE REPORTED IN 
MAIN TEXT 
0.04 
Barr, 
Lane, 
Nosenzo 
(BLN) 
Nationality
*
 Give 16 to in-group, 0 
to out-group 
Allocator vs Impartial Spectator 
0.05 
Artificial
*
 0.36 
Nationality
*
 Give 14 to in-group, 2 
to out-group 
Allocator vs Impartial Spectator 
-0.15 
Artificial
*
 0.17 
Nationality
*
 Give 12 to in-group, 4 
to out-group 
Allocator vs Impartial Spectator 
-0.23 
Artificial
*
 0.19 
Nationality
*
 Give 10 to in-group, 6 
to out-group 
Allocator vs Impartial Spectator 
-0.28 
Artificial
*
 -0.05 
Nationality
*
 Give 6 to in-group, 10 
to out-group 
Allocator vs Impartial Spectator 
-0.44 
Artificial
*
 -0.35 
Nationality
*
 Give 4 to in-group, 12 
to out-group 
Allocator vs Impartial Spectator 
-0.35 
Artificial
*
 -0.21 
Nationality
*
 Give 2 to in-group, 14 
to out-group 
Allocator vs Impartial Spectator 
-0.26 
Artificial
*
 -0.04 
Nationality
*
 Give 0 to in-group, 16 
to out-group 
Allocator vs Impartial Spectator 
-0.19 
Artificial
*
 0.22 
  
AVERAGE REPORTED IN 
MAIN TEXT 
-0.10 
Nationality
*
 Give 8 to in-group, 8 to 
out-group 
Allocator vs Impartial Spectator 
-0.02 
Artificial
*
 -0.25 
   
AVERAGE REPORTED IN 
MAIN TEXT 
-0.14 
*
 Nationality = social identity distinction between allocator and passive players based on nationality; Artificial = 
social identity distinction between allocator and passive players based on minimal group paradigm. 
The effect sizes of eliciting behavior after the norm-elicitation task are based on four studies: the 
present paper, Krupka and Weber (2009), Bicchieri and Chavez (2010) and Barr et al. (2015). 
The effect sizes are based on the differences in behavior measured either after or before a subject 
has evaluated the game she is about to play. Table A.2 reports, for each behavior, the 
corresponding effect size. For papers with more than one treatment, in the main text we report 
effect sizes averaged across the treatments. The effect sizes reported in the main text are 
highlighted in the table. 
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Table A.2 – Effect sizes of eliciting behavior after norms 
Study Treatment Behavior 
Effect Size 
(Hedge’s g) 
D’Adda, Drouvelis, 
Nosenzo (DDN) 
n.a. 
Average bribe offered by firm -0.15 
Average bribe acceptance by official -0.14 
Average punishment by citizen to 
firm 
0.24 
Average punishment by citizen to 
official 
0.07 
Krupka and Weber 
(KW) 
n.a. Average dictator giving 0.80 
Bicchieri and 
Chavez (BC) 
Full
*
 Average ultimatum offer 0.32 
Private
*
 Average ultimatum offer 0.26 
Limited
*
 Average ultimatum offer 0.60 
 
AVERAGE REPORTED IN 
MAIN TEXT 
0.40 
Barr, Lane, 
Nosenzo (BLN) 
Nationality
**
 
Average difference between payoff 
allocated to in-group and out-group 
-0.07 
Artificial
**
 
Average difference between payoff 
allocated to in-group and out-group 
-0.24 
 
AVERAGE REPORTED IN 
MAIN TEXT 
-0.16 
*
 Full, Private, Limited treatments differ in whether or not Responder in ultimatum game 
knew that Proposer’s offer could be the result of a coin flip; see Bicchieri and Chanvez 
(2010) for details. For the cases where the offer was made using a coin flip the expected 
value of the offer is used to compute the effect size. 
**
 Nationality = social identity 
distinction between allocator and passive players based on nationality; Artificial = social 
identity distinction between allocator and passive players based on minimal group paradigm. 
 
 
 
